



Topic A: US-NATO Draw down from Afghanistan in 2014 and the future prospects.

(By Mirza Atta Ur Rauf)

Topic B: US-IRAN nuclear reproach. (By Khadija Atta)



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Befriend to Prosper

Words from Chair



Delegates Assalam-o-Alekum,

I am your director of the UNSC. Debates and speech contest have been my passion for a long period of time and I still remember my first speech that I delivered 18 years ago. But my sheer interest lies in Model United Nations because of diplomacy, and I have always found it exceedingly amazing as a delegate and as a chair as well. I have attended many MUN events for example NIMUN, BIMUN and the NMUN 13 was exceptionally a big success. Delegates I demand from you a standard level of debate. You need to come fully equipped with the diplomacy and oratory skills. Wish you best of luck. You will find me very cooperative and helping.

Befriend to Prosper



Words from Assistant Committee Director

Dear Delegates, Assalam o alaikom!

My name is Khadija Atta and I shall be your Assistant Committee Director for United Nations Security Council. I have done my Masters in Islamic Studies from Punjab University Lahore, and different certificate programs from NUML. Apart from Studies, debates are my passion; I have been participating in debates for 7 years. The experience of MUN was a very new and interesting to me. It's my very first experience as being Assistant Chair Director.

As the ACD of the Security Council I would like to warmly welcome you to the NUML Model United Nations 2014. I hope that it will be a memorable experience for all of you, leading not only to effective policy solutions regarding the problems at hand, but also to new friendships and experiences, which might prove relevant in your future careers.

The Security Council, as you all know, constitutes a crucial body for establishing a stable international environment. Being a Member State's Delegate, there is a demanding, yet rewarding task, which requires a certain level of responsibility for one's actions and decisions. Diplomatic behavior inside, as well as outside of the Council will ensure to uphold the good reputation of this committee. In Council, thorough preparation regarding the topic and your country's position will pay off because knowledge is a form of power! And even during heated debates, respectful and polite behavior towards your fellow delegates will be expected from you. Outside of the Council, I highly recommend you to attend the social events and remain a diplomat to advance your network of international friendships. This also helps to build alliances the next day and, as Ban Ki Mun famously said, "If we do not act together, if we do not act responsibly, if we do not act now, we risk slipping into a cycle of poverty, degradation, and despair". The two topics which the Security Council will consider:

Topic A: US-NATO Draw down from Afghanistan in 2014 and the future prospects.

Topic B: US-IRAN nuclear reproach.

Introduction to Committee

The biggest world programme to curb the international security threats and peacekeeping in the world is exercised under the summits of an Organization called **United Nations Security Council**.

United Nations Security Council was propelled by the World War II aimed to address the failings of other international peace keeping the League of Nations, in maintaining world peace. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the United Nations' principal crisis-management body, empowered to impose binding obligations on the UN's 193 member states to maintain peace. It has 15 Members; with each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. Its first session was held on 17 January 1946.

Out of 15 members, five are permanent members with veto power and ten non-permanent members, elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term. The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, also known as the Permanent Five, Big Five, or P5; including five governments: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The members represent the great powers considered the victors of World War II, plus France, which was one of the overrun countries of Europe that was liberated through the efforts of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Free French Forces. Each of the permanent members has power to veto, enabling them to prevent the adoption of any "substantive" draft Council resolution, regardless of the level of international support for the draft.

Any one of the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—can veto a resolution, a power not afforded to its ten elected members. The P5's privileged status has its roots in the UN's founding in the aftermath of World War II.



The role of UNSC in international collective security is as follows:

- Investigate any situation threatening international peace and security.
- Recommend solutions for peaceful resolution of a dispute.
- Enforce its decisions militarily, or by any means, if necessary.
- Avoid conflict and maintain focus on cooperation.
- Call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations.
- UNSC also recommend the new Secretary-General to the General Assembly.

the Council is not limited to recommendations but may take action, including the use of armed force "to maintain or restore international peace and security". Peacekeeping missions are the most visible face of the UN's conflict-management work; in late 2013 the Council was overseeing sixteen operations and nearly ninety-seven thousand uniformed personnel.

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Topic A:

US-NATO Draw down from Afghanistan in 2014 and the future prospects.

Introduction

USA has announced withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. However soon after the announcement the US administration started using the word reduction instead of withdrawing troops, showing the erroneous use of the word. The US has plans to keep about 10,000 troops in the war-battered Afghanistan after 2014. NATO allies are expected to provide around 5,000 troops if the security related agreement is agreed to among the stake holders in Afghanistan US and NATO.

Background

Troop levels remained roughly constant under Barack Obama's predecessor, former president George W. Bush, with around 30,000 American troops deployed in Afghanistan. In January, about 3,000 U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division moved into the provinces of Logar and Wardak. The troops were the first wave of an expected surge of reinforcements originally ordered by George W. Bush and increased by Barack Obama.

In mid-February Barack Obama ordered on 17 February 2009 17,000 extra US troops be sent to Afghanistan to bolster security in the country and thereby boosted the 36,000 US troops already there by 50%. "This increase is necessary to stabilize a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which has not received the strategic attention, direction and resources it urgently requires," Obama said in a written statement. "The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and al-Qa'ida supports the insurgency and threatens America from its safe haven along the Pakistani border,"



Obama also said. He recognized "the extraordinary strain this deployment places on our troops and military families", but the deteriorating security situation in the region required "urgent attention and swift action". The new troop deployment was expected to include 8,000 U.S. Marines from Camp Legume, North Carolina, 4,000 U.S. Army troops from Fort Lewis Washington and another 5,000 troops from an unspecified branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. Obama also said he was "absolutely convinced that you cannot solve the problem of Afghanistan, the Taliban, and the spread of extremism in that region solely through military means."¹

A further decision on sending more troops came after the administration completed a broader review of Afghanistan policy. On 27 March 2009 US President Obama announced after an intense 60-day White House policy review in which military commanders and diplomats, regional governments, partners, NATO allies, NGOs and aid organizations were consulted, a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. "So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That is the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the same: we will defeat you," Obama said. For this purpose Obama announced that he plans to further bolster American forces in Afghanistan, increase aid to Pakistan, and set strict standards - like levels of violence and casualties in Afghanistan, Pakistani attacks against insurgents and accounting for U.S. aid- for measuring progress in fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban in both countries. Part of his strategy was the deployment of 4,000 U.S. troops - beyond the additional 17,000 he authorized in February—to work as trainers and advisers to the Afghan army and police. The move was accompanied by a "surge" in US civilians to Afghanistan to help rebuild the country's infrastructure. In addition to the renewed focus on Afghanistan, the Obama administration was to step up pressure on Pakistan to tackle the al-Qaida and Taliban safe havens in the tribal areas along its border with Afghanistan. US military and civilian aid was to be increased. The last element of the policy was to try to engage Afghanistan's regional neighbors, including Russia and Iran, in helping to pacify Afghanistan.

2011 Drawdown Speech

On 22 June 2011 President Obama addressed the nation from the White House and announced that 10,000 troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2011 and an additional 23,000 troops will leave the country by the summer of 2012. He said the drawdown would continue "at a steady pace" until the United States handed over security to the Afghan authorities in 2014. "We are starting this drawdown from a position of strength," Obama said. "Al Qaeda is under more pressure than at any time since 9/11." Asserting that the country that served as a base for the 11 September 2001 attacks no longer represented a terrorist threat to the United States, President Obama declared that the "tide of war is receding." The announced drawdown will leave approximately 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan by the autumn of 2012 but Gen. John R. Allen, commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), said that 23,000 of the 88,000 U.S. troops currently in Afghanistan will be home by 30 September 2012 and thus 65,000 U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan after the so-called Phase 2 drawdown.

2011 Drawdown beginning and plans for responsibly ending the Afghanistan war

Further information: U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement

The U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan began 13 July 2011 when the first 650 U.S. troops left Afghanistan as part of President Barack Obama's planned drawdown. The units that left were the Army National Guard's 1st Squadron, 134th Cavalry Regiment, based in Kabul, and the Army National Guard's 1st Squadron, 113th Cavalry Regiment, which had been in neighboring Parwan province.

The United States and its NATO allies finalized agreements on 18 April 2012 to wind down the war in Afghanistan by formalizing three commitments: to move the Afghans gradually into a lead combat role; to keep some international troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, and to pay billions of dollars a year to help support the Afghan security forces.

On 2 May 2012, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and US President Barack Obama signed a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries, after the US president had arrived in Kabul as part of unannounced trip to Afghanistan on the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death. The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, officially titled the "Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America", provides the long-term framework for the relationship between Afghanistan and the United States of America after the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Afghanistan war. The Strategic Partnership Agreement went into effect on 4 July 2012 as stated by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who said on 8 July 2012 at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan: "Like a number of countries represented here, the United States and Afghanistan signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement that went into effect four days ago."

After the signing of the strategic partnership agreement Obama laid out his plans to end the war in Afghanistan responsibly. The plans call for 1) the removal of 23,000 US troops at the summer end of 2012, i.e. at the end of September 2012; 2) Afghan security forces to take the lead in combat operations by the end of 2013 while ISAF forces train, advise and assist the Afghans and fight alongside them when needed; and 3) the complete removal of all U.S. troops by the end of 2014, except for trainers who will assist Afghan forces and a small contingent of troops with a specific mission to combat al-Qaeda through counterterrorism operations.

NATO Chicago Summit: Troops withdrawal and long-term presence

Further information: 2012 Chicago Summit and 2011 NATO attack in Pakistan

On 21 May 2012 the leaders of the NATO-member countries endorsed an exit strategy during the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago. The NATO-led ISAF Forces will hand over command of all combat missions to Afghan forces by the middle of 2013, while shifting at the same time from combat to a support role of advising, training and assisting the Afghan security forces and then withdraw most of the 130,000 foreign troops by the end of December 2014. A new and different

NATO mission will then advise, train and assist the Afghan security forces including the Afghan Special Operations Forces.

Security handover and US suspension of Afghan Local Police forces training

The U.S. is set to hand over responsibility for security to local Afghans by 2014, and efforts are underway to draw down U.S. forces, but US President Barack Obama has not specified a date for the withdrawal of all American troops from the country. President Obama said on 1 September 2012 that he had a "specific plan to bring our troops home from Afghanistan by the end of 2014." On 2 September 2012 White House press secretary Jay Carney then clarified Obama's statement by saying that Obama had "never said that all the troops would be out." Carney noted while the United States would transfer security to Afghan troops by the end of 2014, all U.S. troops would not be out of the country by that date "Everyone understands what the president's policy is, which is a full transition to Afghan security lead by 2014," said Carney. "We have been abundantly clear about the stages of the implementation of that policy. And as in Iraq, that means that while not all U.S. troops will have withdrawn necessarily by then, the Afghan Security Forces will be in full security transition, I mean, will be in full security lead, and U.S. forces will continue to be drawn down."

Us withdrawal from Afghanistan: the plan for the 2012, 2013 and 2014

The 2012 pullout of 23,000 American troops from Afghanistan was on 22 July 2012 at the halfway mark according to U.S. Gen. John Allen, the top commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and would accelerate in the coming months.¹ "August will be the heaviest month," Allen said. "A lot is coming out now and a great deal will come out in August and early September. We'll be done probably around mid-September or so. Up to one half of the 23,000 troops being pulled out 2012 are combat forces, he said. Small numbers are being pulled from the relatively stable northern and western parts of the country. Some will be withdrawn from the east and the south "and a good bit in the southwest," he said. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon

Panetta announced on 21 September 2012 that the 33,000 additional U.S. troops that President Barack Obama had sent to Afghanistan in 2010 to counter the Taliban attacks have left the country. A phased withdrawal plan was developed where 10,000 troops would leave Afghanistan by July 2011 and the remaining 23,000 would leave Afghanistan by the end of September 2012. The removal of the 23,000 U.S. troops began in July 2012. In a statement announcing an end to the surge Panetta stated:

"As we reflect on this moment, it is an opportunity to recognize that the surge accomplished its objectives of reversing Taliban momentum on the battlefield, and dramatically increased the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This growth has allowed us and our ISAF Coalition partners to begin the process of transition to Afghan security lead, which will soon extend across every province and more than 75 percent of the Afghan population. At the same time, we have struck enormous blows against al Qaeda's leadership, consistent with our core goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda and denying it a safe-haven."

Once the United States and its allies agreed on the timing for the shift in the Afghanistan mission — under which American troops would step away from the lead combat role to a supporting mission focused primarily on counterterrorism and training Afghan security forces (according to the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit this shift is planned for the middle of 2013)— the Obama administration must decide exactly when the remaining 68,000 troops will come home according to the New York Times. In September 2012 the United States withdrew then the last of the 33,000 "surge" forces from Afghanistan that President Obama ordered in West Point 2009 to try to bring the Afghanistan war under control. With the reduction over the next two years of the remaining 68,000 American troops, the top American and NATO commander in Afghanistan would lead a force that is to operate from fewer bases and will train Afghan forces to take the lead in combat.

2013 drawdown plans

The number of US troops to remain in Afghanistan during 2013 was still being decided as of March 2012, but it appeared that three options were considered. These three options were: ^[121]



1. A drawdown from 68,000 to 58,000 troops by the end of 2012, with a further drawdown to between 38,000 and 48,000 by June 2013. This would be a continuation of the current policy of gradual drawdown. Obama has stated that he prefers a gradual drawdown.
2. Maintaining 68,000 troops through the end of 2013. This is the US military commanders' preferred option since it maintains US force levels through the summer fighting season in 2013.
3. A large and rapid drawdown, perhaps to 20,000 troops, by the end of 2013. This would leave only Special Operations Forces, counterterrorism forces, military trainers, and some support and security staff in Afghanistan. This is Vice President Biden's preferred option.

According to two American officials who are involved in Afghan issues said that the senior American commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen wanted to keep a significant military capability through the fighting season ending in fall 2013, which could translate to a force of more than 60,000 troops until the end of that period. The United States has not "begun considering any specific recommendations for troop numbers in 2013 and 2014," said George Little, the Pentagon spokesman. "What is true is that in June 2011 the president made clear that our forces would continue to come home at a steady pace as we transition to an Afghan lead for security. That it stills the case."

During the 2013 State of the Union Address US President Barack Obama said that the U.S. military will reduce the troop level in Afghanistan from 68,000 to 34,000 US troops by February 2014. According to an unnamed U.S. official Obama made his decision "based on the recommendations of the military and his national security team," consultations with Karzai and "international coalition partners." The United States has adopted a withdrawal schedule which U.S. General John. R. Allen called a "phased approach." According to the new withdrawal schedule, as reported by the New York Times, the number of troops is to go down from 66,000 troops to 60,500 by the end of May 2013. By the end of November 2013, the number will be down to 52,000. By the end of February 2014, the troop level is to be around 32,000. The Washington Post reported a slightly different withdrawal plan which calls for the U.S. forces figure of 68,000 troops to drop to about 60,000 by May 2013 and 52,500 by November 2013. The largest exodus will occur in December 2013 and January 2014, when about 18,500 troops

will leave Afghanistan. The White House intended to allow the military to determine the pace at which the 34,000 troops are withdrawn over the 12 months until February 2013. Top U.S. military officers have said they hope to keep as many forces as possible in Afghanistan through summer 2013, when combat with the Taliban is usually at its highest. "Commanders will have discretion on pace of this drawdown which will allow them to maintain the force they need through the fighting season," according to one U.S. official. The drawdown announcement generated mixed reactions in Afghanistan: While Afghan officials like President Hamid Karzai and the Taliban welcomed Obama's decision, many Afghans worried that a quick drawdown will destabilize the country. Afghans also expressed their concern that Afghan security forces were not ready to take the lead for security.

As of September 2013 the U.S. military is flying out a large amount of gear instead of using cheaper overland and sea routes, while U.S. officials declined to elaborate on the reasons for their heavy reliance on the more expensive methods of transport.

2014 drawdown plans

The US force level will drop to between 10,000 and 20,000 troops according to the Long War Journal. They will consist of Special Forces, counterterrorism forces, and military training personnel. They will be deployed to a small number of bases around the country. US/ISAF troops will continue their training of Afghan National Security Forces soldiers. Counterterrorism forces will concentrate mostly on high-value targets. U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated on 12 November 2012 that the Obama Administration will cease combat operations by the end of 2014, but it is still refining its timeline for withdrawing the remaining 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The administration was also debating how many trainers, Special Operations forces and military assets it will keep in the country after that to support Afghanistan's army and police.

Post 2014 presence plans

During the 2012 Chicago Summit NATO and its partners agreed to withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. A new and different NATO mission will then advise, train

and assist the Afghan security forces including the Afghan Special Operations Forces. Final decisions on the size of the American and NATO presence after 2014 and its precise configuration have not been made by the United States or its NATO allies as of 26 November 2012, but one option calls for about 10,000 American and several thousand non-American NATO troops according to the United States. The presence shall include a small American counterterrorism force consisting of less than 1,000 American troops, while in a parallel effort, NATO forces would advise Afghan forces at major regional military and police headquarters. According to the New York Times, NATO forces would most likely have a minimal battlefield role, with the exception of some special operations advisers.

An important question for the NATO mission after 2014 was what level of the Afghan military hierarchy they would advise. It was generally expected that they would advise seven regional Afghan Army corps and several regional Afghan police headquarters. The arrangement would largely insulate the NATO advisers from the battlefield, though officials said advisers might accompany Afghan brigades on major operations. It was unlikely that NATO officers would advise Afghan battalions on the battlefield, because that would require many more advisers than NATO was likely to muster and would entail more risk than most nations seem prepared to assume, though some American experts believed it would make the Afghan military more effective. Still, NATO special operations advisers would be likely to accompany Afghan Army commandos and police SWAT-type units on the battlefield.

The NATO-led force in Afghanistan has a current strength of more than 52,000 soldiers, including 33,600 U.S. troops.

Afghanistan faces a critical year ahead as the NATO-led war draws down after twelve years and an impasse in U.S.-Afghan negotiations leaves uncertain the future of Western military support. A drop-off in aid and elections slated for April, who could deliver the country's first democratic transfer of power, will also test Afghanistan's stability. Five experts offer their forecasts.

The end of the U.S. war in Afghanistan should not be confused with the end of the Afghan war, writes the International Crisis Group's Graeme Smith, as Afghan troops cannot yet secure the country on their own. Yet even viable security forces cannot ensure stability if President Hamid

Karzai's successor lacks broad-based support, writes RAND's Seth Jones, or if state institutions fail to become self-sufficient, says Clare Lockhart of the Institute for State Effectiveness. Nader Nadery, of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, warns that an economic downturn threatens to reverse a decade of social progress, while CFR's Daniel Markey notes that neighboring Pakistan will continue to influence Afghan affairs.



Members of the Afghan loya jirga, or grand council, which urged President Hamid Karzai to sign a bilateral security agreement with the United States in November 2013 (Photo: Omar Sobhani/Courtesy Reuters). *Afghan Forces Cannot Go it Alone*

The biggest misconception about the Afghan war is that the conflict is ending. President Barack Obama encouraged this view in his, declaring: "By the end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over." He repeated a similar claim on Veterans Day. If the president was reading the Pentagon's reports to Congress, it's easy to see how he got the wrong idea. The US military assessment is that violence has fallen and "Afghan security forces are now successfully providing security for their own people."


Such rhetoric paves the way for a U.S. exit, but it doesn't help Afghans. If local forces were successfully securing their people, we would not be seeing more civilian deaths. In fact, the United Nations reports that civilian casualties rose 16 percent in the first eight months of 2013.

. Across the country, the UN found a rise in violation—up 11 percent this summer. Other analyses by Western experts show even greater escalation.

This reality on the ground refutes the Pentagon's picture of a war that is cooling down. security worsened in many places as foreign troops pulled back. The situation has calmed in some locations, but local elders warn that insurgents still control large parts of the countryside and may be waiting for a better time to attack.

Why does this matter? President Hamid Karzai must sign a bilateral security agreement with the United States. The Afghan government may not have the firepower to stand without a deal in the short term. Also, the United States and other NATO countries need to stay engaged on security issues after 2014. Afghan forces have a fighting chance, but they need significant help—helicopters, logistics, and many other kinds of assistance—to keep the insurgents at bay.

NATO to plan for all options in Afghanistan, including pullout

A large, faint watermark of the NUMUN logo is centered on the page. It consists of a circular emblem with a globe, surrounded by the text 'NUMUN' and 'NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES', all enclosed within a laurel wreath.

Befriend to Prosper



Nato secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen addresses a news conference during a NATO defense ministers meeting at the alliance headquarters in Brussels February 27, 2014

Reuters) - NATO defense ministers agreed on Thursday to plan for all options for the alliance's future presence in Afghanistan including a possible pullout of all its troops this year, NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen said.

With foreign troops due to end combat operations in Afghanistan at the close of 2014, NATO has been planning to keep a slimmed-down force there to train and assist Afghan forces who continue to battle Taliban insurgents.

But NATO and U.S. officials say President Hamid Karzai's refusal to sign an agreement with the United States creating a legal framework for U.S. troops to stay in Afghanistan could force it to pull out all its troops by the end of the year.

"Today we agreed the need to plan for all possible outcomes including the possibility that we may not be able to deploy to Afghanistan after 2014 due to the persistent delays we have seen," NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen told a news conference.

Rasmussen said he still hoped plans to keep troops in Afghanistan beyond this year could be salvaged. But President Barack Obama has told the Pentagon to prepare for the possibility that no U.S. troops will be left in Afghanistan because of Karzai's refusal to sign the accord.

With an election due in April, NATO officials still hope Karzai's successor could sign the agreement.

"Let me be clear that this is not the outcome we want," Rasmussen said, referring to the option of no NATO troops staying behind in Afghanistan after this year.

Regional Instability

It is assumed that after withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan, the militants would be re-organized and could threaten the peace of the entire region by drawing the neighboring countries in the war. Thus the Reduction/withdrawal can endanger stability of the south and Central Asia. History reveals that after complete withdrawal of Soviet Union forces from Afghanistan in 1988, America ceased taking Interest in Afghanistan and the fighters made their way to Pakistan-India eastern borders.

Economy

Afghanistan's economy is totally dependent on foreign aid that has been cut down to a great extent. Some foreign funded Media outlets, including TV and Radio channels have shut down Or limited their services. In case of instability, foreign investors can cease their projects in Afghanistan that will be a great blow to its economy. According to Afghan embassy sources in Pakistan, about 2000 Pakistanis are going daily to Afghanistan for job, but in case of insecurity the ongoing uplift projects can be stopped. In case of insecurity and instability after 2014 there is also possibility that foreign donors fully stop their aid. There is no

guarantee that Afghan economy and currency will maintain its position after 2014. In the past, Afghans were carrying

At the moment, 50 percent foreign funds have been cut down. After 2014, the dependent Afghanistan would need to stand on its own feet, which would be something very difficult for this war torn country. Afghans who are drawing salaries in dollars and Euros now will plunge into severe despair when dollars are stopped. Afghan government has chalked out no plans over the last decade to achieve economic independence. After 2014, the feeble economy will aggrandize the other pressing problems of Afghanistan.

According to a New York Times report, “NATO forces withdrawal may also jeopardize vital Aid commitments. Afghanistan is decades away from self-sufficiency — it currently covers only about 20 percent of its own bills, with the rest paid by the United States and its allies.”

The poor or no economic strategies of Afghanistan will deepen the economic crisis after 2014. Afghan government has even made no clear plans regarding salaries of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan police. Strangely enough, Economy, the foremost and biggest challenge, seldom becomes part of the post-2014 agenda. Taliban can therefore exploit economically weak Afghanistan.

As the country is dependent upon aid, therefore it has been less focused upon trade over the last decade. Vibrant trade ties with neighboring countries could save Afghanistan economy from sinking after 2014. Besides, Afghanistan has no refined tax policy that is needed for running affairs of the country. In over a decade of its tenure, the Afghan government could not introduce a proportionate tax policy, and after 2014 collection of tax will be a great challenge for the government that would have a direct effect on the country’s economy.

There is every chance that Afghanistan can weather the three transitions—in security, politics, and economics—in 2014 and sustain the gains that have been made over the last decade. Security commitments are a necessary condition for post-2014 stability, but the other critical pillar is an election that delivers a new government that can build consensus and deliver on expectations.

Assuming that such a government is elected, stability beyond 2014 will rest on its ability to tackle the following five challenges:

First, state institutions beyond the security sector must be viable; a well-functioning army is insufficient to govern a country. Vital state functions include maintaining a public-finance system; providing health services and education; planning infrastructure for transportation, communications, irrigation, and energy; and managing sources of revenue, including municipalities, tenders, and licenses. A reform agenda needs to address corruption and ensure services work not only in the major cities but also in the towns and villages.

Second, Afghanistan can no longer rely on open checkbooks from the rest of the world. The sooner it moves toward revenue self-sufficiency, the sooner it can wean itself off international aid. This will require a clear-eyed look at what's needed to grow important sectors—including agriculture, extractives, and light industry—and link them to markets inside and outside the country. It will also entail a focus on corruption and reducing revenue losses to middlemen.

Third, Afghanistan needs a politics of inclusion, in which individuals and groups agree on a national agenda and work across historical boundaries to govern together. Though a majority of the country wants to live in peace and stability, the perception and reality of disenfranchisement has been a significant driver of violence. The spring 2014 election is an opportunity both to address grievances and to rally the country's citizens through national debate and interethnic coalitions. Mechanisms must be established for citizens to come to terms with the grave injuries of the past.

Fourth, Afghanistan and its neighbors have a historic opportunity to move beyond zero-sum politics to find a regional framework for cooperation on political, security, and economic tracks, and cease to use one territory to destabilize another.

10 fact about US withdrawal from Afghanistan

Fact 1: It is not the case that all US troops will be removed from Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

In June 2011, President Obama announced his plan to begin the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. But the president did not say that all US troops would leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014. What he did say was 10,000 troops would be removed by the end of the summer 2011, with 23,000 additional troops leaving at the end of the summer of 2012. After that, according to the President:

Our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead. Our mission will change from combat to support. By 2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.

Notice that the President did not say that our mission in Afghanistan will end by 2014, only that it will cease to be a "combat" mission and become a "support" mission. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney has since confirmed that President Obama never said US troops would be completely withdrawn by the end of 2014.

What you should be asking yourself is, "what is a support mission?", "how many troops will be required for it?", and "how long will it last?" We will get to these questions shortly. First, it's important to highlight one thing:

Fact 2: There is currently no end date for the war in Afghanistan.

Nowhere in the President's June 2011 speech did he mention a deadline for the full withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, and no date for full withdrawal has been specified since then. In fact, the Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was struck between the United States and Afghanistan in June 2012, provides for a US military presence after 2014, although the magnitude of the presence was not specified.

On November 15, 2012, it was reported that Afghanistan and the United States had begun negotiations for a bilateral security agreement, which will govern the US military presence in Afghanistan post-2014, including how many troops are left in Afghanistan, and for how long.

Fact 3: There is no set plan for removing the remaining 68,000 troops left in Afghanistan.

Not only are there currently twice as many US troops in Afghanistan today as there were when President Obama took office, but the administration has yet to outline a specific plan for removing the 68,000 troops that remain, except that most of them will be removed by the end of 2014. A decision about a scheduled for the removal of these troops will not be made until after a decision is made about the number of residual troops the US will leave in Afghanistan post-2014. However, it has been reported that General John Allen wants to keep over 60,000 US troops until the fall of 2013.

Three options were being considered in March 2012:

1. The drawdown plan said to be favored by Vice President Joe Biden would drawdown troops rapidly, to perhaps 20,000, by the end of 2013.
2. A more gradual drawdown plan calls for removing 10,000 troops by the end of December 2012, leaving 58,000 troops. An additional 10,000 to 20,000 would be removed by June 2013, leaving between 48,000 and 38,000 troops in Afghanistan, still more than were in the country when President Obama took office.
3. Military commanders are said to favor delaying further cuts until the end of 2013, including Lt. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, who was the second-in-command of US forces in Afghanistan until June 2012 and is now the Director of the Joint Staff.

Fact 4: Reports indicate that the Pentagon wants to keep between 6,000 and 20,000 US troops in Afghanistan until at least 2024.

On November 12, 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told reporters that the Obama administration would come to a decision within the next few weeks about the magnitude of the US post-2014 military presence in Afghanistan. Panetta would not comment on the troop levels

being considered. Since then, it has been reported that General John Allen, head of the ISAF, has submitted three plans for an enduring US presence in Afghanistan:

1. With 6,000 troops, the focus of the US mission would be on counterterrorism missions, and logistical and training support for Afghan forces would be limited;
2. With 10,000 troops, the US could expand training and logistical support from the 6,000 troop plan;
3. With 20,000 troops, US convention forces could be used to patrol certain areas.

All of these options include troop commitments smaller than the 25,000 troops the Pentagon is said to have favored since Obama's drawdown announcement.

However, just days after General Allen's recommendations made news, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that President Obama requested three additional proposals in which troop levels did not exceed 10,000. The plans submitted by the Pentagon included:

1. A 3,000 troop option, which Pentagon officials strongly warned against;
2. A 6,000 troop option, assumed to be the same as the 6,000 troop option described above;
3. A 9,000 troop option, assumed to be similar to the 10,000 troop option above.

Out of these three options, the Pentagon is said to favor the 9,000 troop option, while the White House is said to favor the 6,000 troop option.

Keep in mind that there were only 34,000 troops there when Obama took office. If 20,000 troops are kept in Afghanistan after 2014, that means that the net withdrawal would be a mere 14,000 troops. Furthermore, before 2007, troop levels were at roughly 20,000 or less. So leaving 20,000 troops in Afghanistan would be to merely return to 2006 troop levels. Leaving 9,000 or 10,000 troops would be a return to 2003 troop level.

If the Pentagon gets its way, the US will be at war in Afghanistan for at least 12 additional years—that's one more year than we've been at war to this point. That means that we wouldn't even be at the half-way mark today, let alone nearing the end!



Fact 5: The "support" mission will not necessarily be small, nor will it be free of combat missions.

A "support" mission sure sounds more reassuring than a combat mission, right? Sounds like only a few troops will remain behind to support the Afghan security forces?

Any close reading of the US public position on its post-2014 mission in Afghanistan immediately dispels such consoling thought. Just look at the plans General John Allen has proposed for the US enduring presence, listed above. Each of the Pentagon's proposals include a counterinsurgency element. In fact, the 6,000 troop plan, which the White House is said to favor prioritizes direct counterinsurgency missions over logistical support and training for the Afghan security forces, even though it is supposedly for the latter reason that US officials claim an enduring presence is necessary. Meanwhile, the plan involving the largest amount of troops adds a patrol capacity, which is clearly a combat, not a support, capacity. It is likely that a combat capacity is emphasized in the Pentagon's plans due to a recognition that the Afghan security forces, even after a decade of training, are far from ready to take over security for the country.

Further, the US "support" mission in Iraq serves as an example and a warning for the continued US military presence in Afghanistan. The combat mission in Iraq supposedly ended in August 2010, at which point troop levels were brought down to 50,000. In October 2011, over a year later, there were still about 45,000 troops left in Iraq. Furthermore, these supposedly non-combat troops would engage in combat missions and were described as having a "combat capacity" by administration officials, including former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in which they engage in "targeted counterterrorism operations" and work and fight alongside Iraqi security forces. In light of this, "support" seems to be nothing more than a euphemism for extended combat.

Per a previous agreement between the US and Iraqi governments, all US troops were supposed to leave Iraq at the end of 2011. That didn't stop the Obama administration from trying to pressure the Iraqi government to extend the deadline, allowing the US to leave up to 10,000 troops indefinitely. Fortunately, this plan has been abandoned, and all but about 150 US troops attached

to the US Embassy left on time. But a similar fight over keeping to a deadline for withdrawal may erupt in the future over Afghanistan--whenever a deadline is, in fact, established.

Fact 6: Obama's "surge" is not over.

In September 2012, it was widely reported that Obama's "troop surge" in Afghanistan was over, leaving 68,000 troops in the country. But when President Obama took office, there were only roughly 34,000 US troops in Afghanistan. In two "surges", Obama added to this figure over 66,000 additional troops. By reducing the US troop presence by 33,000, his drawdown plan has removed only half the number of troops that he sent to Afghanistan, not all.

Fact 7: There are less than 100 al Qaeda left in Afghanistan--but there are over 600,000 Afghan and international forces there to fight them.

In June 2010, Leon Panetta said that there were less than 100 members of al Qaeda left in Afghanistan. According to the latest Brookings Institute Afghanistan Index, there are about 108,000 international troops in Afghanistan under NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom; 344,108 Afghan Security Forces; 90,000 private Defense Department contractors; and 2,000 private contractors training the Afghan Army. Additionally, there are 150,000 Pakistani troops on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. That's a grand total of 694,108 versus 100. Seems bit overkill.

Fact 8: The lack of a timetable for withdrawal is a key obstacle in peace negotiations with the Taliban.

Taliban spokesmen have made it quite clear that peace requires a willingness by the US to leave; but the US military has done just the opposite through its negotiations with the Afghan government to keep tens of thousands of US troops in Afghanistan indefinitely.

Fact 9: There is elite support for an expedited withdrawal.

Elite groups ranging from the Afghanistan Study Group, which was endorsed by a large number of national security and Middle East experts, to the *New York Times* have come out in support of

an accelerated US military withdrawal from--and oppose an extended military stay in--
Afghanistan.

Congress has also expressed support for a quicker withdrawal. On November 30, 2011, the US Senate adopted a measure by voice vote in favor of an accelerated US military withdrawal from Afghanistan. In May 2012, 90 Members of Congress joined Rep. Barbara Lee in calling upon President Obama to expedite the withdrawal. And in November 2012, the Senate voted 62-33 in favor of a measure that calls upon President Obama to continue withdrawing US troops at a steady pace, to end all regular US combat missions in Afghanistan no later than December 31, 2014, and to "take all possible steps" to end such operations earlier.

Fact 10: There is popular support for ending the war now.

Although polls of American public opinion on US withdrawal from Afghanistan tend to conflate the withdrawal of all "combat" troops with the withdrawal of all troops, majorities are still shown to oppose an indefinite US military presence in Afghanistan. A March 2012 Gallop poll reported 50% of Americans in favor of withdrawing all US troops before 2014, with an additional 24% favoring a full withdrawal by the end of 2014. An October 2012 Pew poll found an even greater majority in favor of a quick withdrawal: 60% of Americans said they wanted US troops removed from Afghanistan as soon as possible, while only 35% support leaving US troops there "until the situation stabilizes."

What is perhaps most interesting about some of these polls is that they seem to reflect a general confusion over President Obama's plan for withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Pew poll, for example, reported that 73% of Democrats supported a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan instead of waiting. Yet, 66% of Democrats say that President Obama is handling the removal of US troops "about right."

Also interestingly, the Pew poll reported 25% of Republicans said that President Obama is removing troops too slowly.

NMUN

How will Afghan forces fare as NATO Troops draw down?



An Afghan soldier stands guard in the western city of Herat in October. U.S. Maj. Gen. James McConville, who commands coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan, says Afghan forces did hold their ground this year, but "they're not winning by enough that the enemy is willing to stop fighting yet."

Shiite Muslims gathered in Kabul last week to celebrate Ashura, one of the holiest days on their religious calendar. Hundreds of shirtless men chanted and flogged themselves with chains tipped with knife-like shards of metal.

In the past, these public Shiite commemorations have become targets of the Taliban and other Islamist extremists. In 2011, a suicide bomber killed 56 Shiites marking Ashura

"Security is better compared to previous years in Afghanistan, but we cannot say our country is fully secure," he said through a translator. "There are provinces and cities that are very insecure."

Wardak province, just southwest of Kabul, is one. Zalmai, a civil servant who uses only one name, said there's no security there.

"I cannot go to my province because the roads are not safe," he said in Dari.

Zalmai, like many Afghans, said he doesn't think Afghan forces are ready to provide security without NATO support. And that support has been the subject of negotiations between U.S. and Afghan officials, who reached a compromise Tuesday on a security agreement that would allow some U.S. troops to stay in the country after 2014.

A special assembly of Afghan tribal and religious leaders convenes later this week to debate the agreement. If they reject it, it is likely that all U.S. and NATO troops will be out of Afghanistan by the end of next year.

Afghan Forces

This year has been a test case for Afghan forces. NATO handed over security duties last spring just as the annual Taliban offensive began. It was a campaign intended to demoralize Afghan forces and undermine public confidence in the military and the government.

U.S. Maj. Gen. James McConville assumed command of NATO forces in the east just as that spring offensive began.

"What I was concerned about as we came in, at least I was watching for, is as we brought our soldiers down, could the Afghans hold?" McConville said.

He says Afghan forces did hold their ground this year — but there's plenty of room for improvement.

"They're not winning by enough that the enemy is willing to stop fighting yet," he said.

Maj. Gen. Afzal Aman, head of operations in Afghanistan's Ministry of Defense, says Taliban fighters did not achieve their goals during this year's fighting season.

But, he says, Afghan forces still need help with logistics and air power, as well as continued training. That training will end next year unless there is a security agreement with the U.S.

Taliban Attacks

The Taliban remain deeply entrenched in parts of the south and east. Taliban fighters carried out several high-profile attacks in Kabul and elsewhere this year, including some areas that had been considered secure. The militants killed thousands of civilians, soldiers and police officers.



Historically, Taliban attacks drop significantly in the winter, but with presidential elections scheduled next spring, Taliban leaders have vowed to keep up the fight to prevent the vote.

"We have an operational plan for fall and winter in preparation for the elections," Aman said.

McConville said he hopes there will be enough of a lull this winter to carry out training of Afghan forces designed to lower their casualty rate, which NATO officials have called unsustainable.



During peak fighting this past summer, as many as 100 Afghan soldiers and policemen were dying each week. NATO has lost fewer than 200 troops all year.

McConville says the Afghans are particularly vulnerable to roadside bombs and traffic accidents, and they still need medical training.

"During the winter, we want to give them an opportunity to train on those things, and I've kept additional forces here to make that happen," he said.

But many of those forces are scheduled to pull out by February, and that will put even more pressure on an Afghan military that is still learning how to sustain itself.

Under NATO's preferred plan for a post-2014 training mission, that force would be cut to 8,000 to 12,000 soldiers, headquartered in Kabul with four regional bases.

Without going so far as a total pullout, dubbed the "zero option", NATO could also look at scaling back that plan and retain a smaller force just in the capital, diplomats say.

NATO's top military commander, U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove, said he and U.S. General Joe Dunford, who commands U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, both very strongly supported the original plan for the post-2014 mission.

"That is the mission that we have planned and embraced and I think provides the best future for Afghanistan and that is the mission we hope to execute," he said in an interview with Reuters and The Wall Street Journal.

He said NATO commanders have already planned the drawdown of NATO forces in Afghanistan this year to give political leaders flexibility "all the way through the year" to either leave enough forces for the new training mission or to pull out altogether.

But Breedlove, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said a decision "very late in the fall" to quit Afghanistan entirely could create problems in closing down major military bases such as Kandahar in the south or Mazar-i-Sharif in the north.

"If we get a very late decision on those large bases, we won't be able to get all the kit out, but we will get all of the high value (equipment), what we really want to bring out.

"You just can't say on December, you know, whatever your date, close Mazar-i-Sharif in three days. It is not going to happen," he said.

Questions to Consider

1. Stability of Afghanistan after the removal of Nato forces?
2. Does the situation exactly demand the removal of the Nato forces?
3. Nato forces will be removed by 2014? All or by and by? What exactly is the reality?
4. Actions to be taken for the peace and stability in Afghanistan in case Nato forces are removed?
5. Actions of the Taliban will be more dangerous if Nato forces leave Afghanistan?

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Topic B

US-IRAN NUCLEAR REPROACH

At Present, the relations between US. And the Iran is fraught with tension. For many years the two countries were close allies. Infact, with support of U.S, the Iranian government began its nuclear program in the 1960s to produce nuclear fuel. In 1968 Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was the international treaty that regulates international nuclear activities and aims to prevent the proliferation, or spread, of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. response to Iran's nuclear program is tied to a number of important issues. The United States has labeled the Iranian government a state sponsor of terrorism for its support of radical Islamic groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories.

History

The nuclear program of Iran has been a matter of contention with the international community since 2002, when an Iranian dissident group revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency, charged with monitoring and ensuring peaceful nuclear activities, referred the matter of Iran's nuclear program to the UN Security Council in February 2006, after finding that Iran had not been in compliance with its duties as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For what the IAEA judged to be continued non-compliance, the UN Security Council has voted four times since 2006 to impose limited economic sanctions against Iran. In its resolutions, the Council required Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA and to suspend all uranium enrichment-related activities. Dore Gold, Israel's former ambassador to the United Nations, has emphasized that the resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and "are legally binding under international law, adding further legal force to the argument that Iran has no legal right

whatsoever to enrich uranium". In addition, the United States and European Union have voluntarily imposed additional sanctions against Iran, targeting its natural resource exports (particularly oil and natural gas), petrochemical, aerospace and automotive industries, banking system, and access to international finance. Iran held a presidential election in June 2013 that was won by Hassan Rouhani, his campaign promised moderation and constructive engagement with the international community over its nuclear program and reverse Iran's international isolation. Rouhani was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005. In addition, the Associated Press reported in November 2013 that officials in the Obama administration had been in contact secretly with Iranian officials throughout 2013 about the feasibility of an agreement over the Iranian atomic program. The report said that American and Iranian officials met face-to-face five times in Oman. The secret meetings, personally authorised by Obama, were launched in March 2013 in Muscat, while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was in power. Obama informed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of these talks when Netanyahu visited the White House on 30 September 2013.

Tehran Declaration

On 21 October 2003, in Tehran, the Iranian government and EU-3 Foreign Ministers issued a statement known as the Tehran Declaration in which Iran agreed to co-operate with the IAEA, to sign and implement an Additional Protocol as a voluntary, confidence-building measure, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities during the course of the negotiations. The EU-3 in return explicitly agreed to recognize Iran's nuclear rights and to discuss ways Iran could provide "satisfactory assurances" regarding its nuclear power program, after which Iran would gain easier access to modern technology. Iran signed an Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003, and agreed to act as if the protocol were in force, making the required reports to the IAEA and allowing the required access by IAEA inspectors, pending Iran's ratification of the Additional Protocol.

Safeguard agreement

According to the report of IAEA, 10 November 2003, Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored.

A comprehensive list of Iran's specific "breaches" of its IAEA safeguards agreement, which the IAEA described as part of a "pattern of concealment," can be found in 15 November 2004, report of the IAEA on Iran's nuclear program. Iran gives some attributes to its failure to report certain acquisitions and activities on US obstructionism, which pressured the IAEA to cease providing technical assistance to Iran's uranium conversion program in 1983.

Paris Agreement

Under the terms of the Paris Agreement, on 14 November 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator announced a voluntary and temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment program (enrichment is not a violation of the NPT) and the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, after pressure from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany acting on behalf of the European Union (EU, known in this context as the EU-3). According to Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, one of the Iranian representatives to the Paris Agreement negotiations, the Iranians made it clear to their European counterparts that Iran would not consider a permanent end to uranium enrichment.

The talks between Iran and EU-3 made little progress because of the divergent positions of the two sides but under the pressure from US, the European negotiators could not agree to allow enrichment on Iranian soil. The EU-3 broke a commitment they had made to recognize Iran's right under NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In early August 2005, after the June election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President, Iran removed seals on its uranium enrichment equipment in Isfahan, which UK officials termed a "breach of the Paris Agreement" though a case can be made that the EU violated the terms of the Paris Agreement by demanding that Iran abandon nuclear enrichment. Several days later, the EU-3 offered Iran a package in return for permanent cessation of enrichment. Reportedly, it included benefits in the political, trade and nuclear fields, as well as long-term supplies of nuclear materials and assurances of non-aggression by the EU (but not the US). Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy head of Iran's atomic energy organization rejected the offer, terming it "very insulting and humiliating" and other independent analysts characterized the EU offer as an "empty box" Iran's announcement that it would resume enrichment preceded the election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad by several months. The delay in restarting the program was to allow the IAEA to re-install monitoring equipment.

On 24 September 2005, after Iran abandoned the Paris Agreement, the Board found that Iran had been in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, based largely on facts that had been reported as early as November 2003.

Involvement of Different Countries

In August 2005, with the assistance of Pakistan a group of US government experts and International scientists concluded that traces of bomb-grade uranium found in Iran came from contaminated Pakistani equipment and were not evidence of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iran. In September 2005, IAEA's Director General Mohammad ElBaradei reported that most highly enriched uranium traces found in Iran.

In a speech to the United Nations on 17 September 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggested that Iran's enrichment might be managed by an international consortium, with Iran sharing ownership with other countries. The offer was rejected out of hand by the EU and the United States.

On 4 February 2006, the 35 member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted 27–3 (with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa) to report Iran to the UN Security Council. The measure was sponsored by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and it was backed by the United States. Two permanent council members, Russia and China, agreed to referral only on condition that the council takes no action before March. The three members who voted against referral were Venezuela, Syria and Cuba. In response, on 6 February 2006, Iran suspended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary and non-legally binding cooperation with the IAEA beyond what is required by its safeguards agreement.

In late February 2006, IAEA Director Mohammad El-Baradei raised the suggestion of a deal, whereby Iran would give up industrial-scale enrichment and instead limit its program to a small-scale pilot facility, and agree to import its nuclear fuel from Russia. The Iranians indicated that while they would not be willing to give up their right to enrichment in principle, they were willing to consider the compromise solution. However, in March 2006, the Bush Administration made it clear that they would not accept any enrichment at all in Iran.

Official Announcement

On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched uranium. President Ahmadinejad made the announcement in a televised address from the northeastern city of Mashhad, where he said "I am officially announcing that Iran joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology." The uranium was enriched to 3.5% using over a hundred centrifuges.

President Ahmadinejad vowed that Iran will not back away from uranium enrichment and that the world must treat Iran as a nuclear power, saying "Our answer to those who are angry about

Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: “Be angry at us and die of this anger, because we won’t hold talks with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium.”

Iran responded to the demand to stop enrichment of uranium 24 August 2006, offering to return to the negotiation table but refusing to end enrichment. In UN Security Council Resolution 1737 of 26 December 2006, the Council imposed a series of sanctions on Iran for its non-compliance with the earlier Security Council resolution deciding that Iran suspends enrichment-related activities without delay.

Reproaches to Iran Nuclear progress

- **Attacks on Iranian nuclear scientists**

In a January 2012 article the killing of at least five Iranian nuclear scientists was noted during 2010 and 2011, by unknown attackers, with no apparent outcry in the Western media.

According to Iran, and privately confirmed by unnamed U.S. government officials, the attacks on the nuclear scientists and facilities are being carried out by an Iranian dissident group called the People's Mujahedin of Iran. According to the officials, the group is financed, trained, and armed by Mossad.

- **Sanctions**

Overview of UN sanctions against Iran

Iran has been subjected to four rounds of United Nations Security Council sanctions in relation to its nuclear programme. In spite of this, it has continued its uranium enrichment operations and there is growing pressure for sanctions to be tightened further. The following are the UN resolutions relating to Iran's nuclear programme.

First Round of Sanctions – Resolution 173713

- Block Iran's import and export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment and to freeze the financial assets of those involved in Iran's nuclear activities.
- The Council decided that all countries should prevent the supply or sale of equipment and technology that would aid Iran's nuclear programme in any way.

Second and Third Rounds of Sanctions – Resolution 1747 and 1803

- Toughen sanctions.
- Banned all of Iran's arms exports.
- Measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly of: all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA.
- Froze the assets and restricted the travel of people it deemed involved in the nuclear programme.
- Scrutiny of the dealings of Iranian banks

Fourth Round of Sanctions – Resolution 192916

- Approved fresh sanctions against Tehran.
- Prohibit Iran from buying heavy weapons such as attack helicopters and missiles.
- Toughen rules on financial transactions with Iranian banks
- Increase the number of Iranian individuals and companies that are targeted with asset freezes and travel bans.
- Introduced a new framework of cargo inspections to detect and stop Iran's acquisition of illicit materials.

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Resolutions on Iran

The UN Security Council has passed eight resolutions on Iran:

- Resolution 1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities.
- Resolution 1737 (23 December 2006) imposed sanctions after Iran refused to suspend its enrichment activities, required Iran to cooperate with IAEA.
- Resolution 1747 (24 March 2007) expanded the list of sanctioned Iranian entities.
- Resolution 1803 (3 March 2008) extended those sanctions to additional persons and entities.
- Resolution 1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed the preceding four resolutions.
- Resolution 1929 (9 June 2010) imposed a complete arms embargo on Iran, banned Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles, authorized the inspection and seizure of shipments violating these restrictions, and extended the asset freeze to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), established Panel of Experts.

Iran's Response to Resolution 192918

On June 18 Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has issued a declaration in response to a recent UN Security Council resolution against the country. It mentions Israel's attack on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla less than ten days before the adoption of the Resolution, and accuses the United States of defending the "Zionist regime" and thus preventing the Security Council from taking any action against the atrocities. It also states that the resolution ignored the final declaration of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Review Conference that was

adopted 15 days earlier by 189 countries. This declaration required the Israel to abide by the NPT. Consequently Iran stresses the absurdity of the fact that there is no UNSC resolution condemning the nuclear activities of the “Zionist regime. Nor has the Council shown any intention of finding out who has provided nuclear weapons to the Zionist regime.” Among other things Iran states that the adoption of this resolution proves that “the Security Council is not a proper forum to uphold the maintenance of international peace and security and a body to secure the rights of nations. It proves that as long as the United States formally regards itself committed to the security of the Zionist regime and continues to support its atrocities, the Security Council is not able to adopt any resolution condemning the many crimes committed by the Zionist regime.” It goes on claiming that the United States tries to distract and redirect world public opinion from the real threats by concocting made-up and fictitious threats. The real threats are the direct results of flawed policies by the American regime in stockpiling nuclear weapons and supporting state terrorism.

Iran also expresses the view that certain monopolist governments are determined to deprive other nations of peaceful nuclear technology and having access to fuel cycle which are clear examples of the right to development, right to natural resources and the right to self-determination. As a result of all the above Iran declares:

1. Entry of the Security Council into the subject relating to peaceful activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran is illegal, unwarranted and contrary to Article 39 of the Charter.
2. It also fully contravenes the organizational and safeguard requirements of the IAEA. The Council needs to take prompt action in redressing and putting right its past mistakes.
3. The Islamic Republic of Iran openly and clearly declares that any action against the lawful and legitimate rights of people of Iran will be responded by reciprocal lawful actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

United States and Iran

Former President Bill Clinton noted about Iran Issue

"The more of these weapons you have hanging around, the more fissile material you've got, the more they're vulnerable to being stolen or sold or just simply transferred to terrorists."

President George W. Bush insisted on 31 August 2006, that there must be consequences for Iran's defiance of demands that it stop enriching uranium. He asserted that the world now faces a grave threat from the radical regime in Iran. The Iranian regime arms, funds, and advises Hezbollah. The IAEA issued a report saying Iran had not suspended its uranium enrichment activities, a United Nations official said. This report opened the way for UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. Facing a Security Council deadline to stop its uranium enrichment activities, Iran has left little doubt it will defy the West and continue its nuclear program.

In December 2008, President-Elect Barack Obama gave an interview on Sunday's "Meet the Press" with host Tom Brokaw during which he said the United States needs to "ratchet up tough but direct diplomacy with Iran". He said in his view the United States needs to make it clear to the Iranians that their alleged development of nuclear weapons and funding of organizations "like Hamas and Hezbollah," and threats against Israel are "unacceptable." Obama supports diplomacy with Iran without preconditions "to pressure Iran to stop their illicit nuclear program". Mohamed ElBaradei has welcomed the new stance to talk to Iran as "long overdue". Iran said Obama should apologize for the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II and his administration should stop talking to the world and "listen to what others are saying." In his first press interview as President, Obama told Al Arabiya that "if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us."

The impending opening of the Bushehr I plant in late 2010 prompted the White House to question why Iran is continuing to enrich uranium within its borders. White House spokesman



Robert Gibbs said in August that Russia is providing the fuel, and taking the fuel back out and Iran does not need its own enrichment capability if its intentions, as it states, are for a peaceful nuclear program.

On 14 January 2013, the Institute for Science and International Security (a U.S. think tank) published a 154-page report by five U.S. experts titled "U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East," which stated that Iran could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for one or more nuclear bombs by the middle of 2014. Therefore, the report recommended that the United States should increase sanctions on Iran in order to curb its ability to develop weapon-grade uranium. In addition the report states that the president should explicitly declare that he will use military force to destroy Iran's nuclear program if Iran takes additional decisive steps toward producing a bomb.

On 2 February 2013, speaking at the Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden said that the Obama Administration would be prepared to meet bilaterally with the Iranian leadership that there has to be an agenda that they're prepared to speak to. A few days later Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected the offer and added ambiguously: "The U.S. policies in the Middle East have failed and the Americans are in need of a winning hand. That is bringing Iran to the negotiating table."

On 4 February the Italian news-wire "Agenzia Nova", citing "sources in Teheran," reported that from the beginning of the year Ali Larijani, Speaker of the (Iranian) Parliament, secretly traveled twice to the United States, to launch direct negotiations with the Obama Administration. The Italian Agency explained that U.S. diplomacy was waiting for the Presidential election in Iran, that most probably will see a dramatic change in Iranian approach. It was reported on 17 June Iran's newly elected president Hassan Rohani had expressed readiness for bilateral talks with Washington, with conditions.

Present implementations

Implementation began on 20 January 2014; IAEA interim report confirmed that Iran had begun scaling back major nuclear activities, the first steps to implement the interim deal. The report followed by the partial lifting of sanctions by the United States and the EU. Iran's first payment of sanctions relief, of \$550 million, is scheduled to be transferred on 1 February. Iran is also scheduled to receive five additional payments of \$550 million through the end of July 2014, as well as \$900 million in two installments for the dilution of its enriched uranium. European shipping and insurance companies will also be allowed to conduct business with Iranian oil shipments to six countries currently waived from facing U.S. sanctions. According to ISIS, Iran would have to take drastic measures to reach a final agreement. In addition to removing thousands of centrifuges that enrich uranium, Iran would have to shut down an underground uranium-enrichment site, convert a heavy water reactor and agree to a 20-year inspections regime

The P5+1 and Iran held meetings at the senior levels February 18-20 and agreed on a framework for future negotiations. Following expert talks, a next round of senior-level talks is scheduled to be held in Vienna starting 17 March 2014. On February 20, 2014 the IAEA reported that Iran was implementing its commitments to the P5+1 and its commitments to the IAEA under the Joint Statement of 11 November 2013.

Iran and Middle East

Iran has consistently supported the creation of a nuclear-weapons free zone in the Middle East. In 1974, as concerns in the region grew over Israel's nuclear weapon program, Iran formally proposed the concept of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East in a joint resolution in the UN General Assembly. The Shah of Iran had made a similar appeal five years earlier but had failed to attract any support. The call for the creation of nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle

East was repeated by Iran's President Ahmadinejad in 2006. It was reiterated by Iran's Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki in 2008.

While on the other hand, since 2006, at least 13 Arab countries have either announced new plans to explore atomic energy or revived pre-existing nuclear programs (including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, and Syria) in response to Iran's nuclear program. Many Middle Eastern countries sought to strengthen their nuclear cooperation with other nations, such as the United States, Russia and France. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE signed nuclear cooperation accords with the United States, and Russia and Egypt have laid the groundwork for Russia to join a tender for Egypt's first civilian nuclear power station. Kuwait, Bahrain, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan announced plans to build nuclear plants as well. Even Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the Arab world announced plans to purchase a nuclear reactor.

Most Arab countries say publicly they are only interested in peaceful uses of nuclear technology, but the fear is that some or all may follow the Iranian example and work toward building a bomb. In fact, former U.S. diplomat Dennis Ross said he was told by Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, "If they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons" (Haaretz, May 30 2012). The Saudi position was reaffirmed by an official close to Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal who said in June 2011, "If Iran develops a nuclear weapon that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit" (*The Guardian*, June 29, 2011).

Questions to Consider

- How has the US responded to nuclear threats in the past?
- What are the difficulties that Iran presents as a nuclear state that other nuclear powers do not?
- What military options does the US have that would keep both the US and Israel safe from retaliations?
- Looking at the possible consequences should a military option even be on the table?
- What are the political implications of a war with Iran?

- How can the US ensure that Iran does not make use of nuclear weapons given their ongoing reluctance to let UN inspectors in the area?
- How hard would (has) the Iranian economy be hit with the banning of Oil exports?
- How might Iran react to such a ban that would cause serious economic harm compared to past sanctions that have only affected a segment of the economy?

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